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Abstract
The minimum wage in San Francisco was increased from $6.75 to $8.5 per hour in
November 2003. This was primarily aimed to improve low-income workers' well-being,
especially racial and ethnic minorities. This paper conducts a difference-in-difference
model using a synthetic control group for San Francisco, looking into a possible change in
employees' demographic composition in Accommodation & Food Services, and
Manufacturing industries. The results indicate that the ratio of white employees increased
significantly, suggesting that a labor-labor substitution happened in the following years of
the minimum wage increase.
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Introduction
A new minimum wage floor is believed to have different effects on employment in various
industries. Several articles highlight the adverse effects of an increase in the minimum wage on
low-wage workers. These workers may experience hourly wage gains, but the hours of work and
employment typically decrease.1 These studies are consistent with the theoretical standpoint that
has been discussed in almost any principle of economics textbooks. However, Card & Krueger
(1994) do not find an adverse effect of increasing the minimum wage on employment. There are
numerous papers that contribute to this debate, and the studies use a broad host of different
methods and case studies.
Based on another famous paper, the binding minimum wage would not have a statistically
significant effect on employment; instead, this increase in the minimum wage might result in
higher employment of the younger workforce.2 This paper and a variety of other studies also
contribute to the debate mentioned above. They can help reconcile the apparent discrepancies
between the papers backing the employment decrease and the ones that do not – with identifying
labor-labor substitution instead of a significant effect on employment levels. In the case of Los
Angeles County, Fairrais and Bujanda (2008), for example, finds evidence of a labor substitution
toward more males, high-skilled Hispanics and Blacks workers. Another explanation for weak
evidence of minimum wage affecting employment is that the mentioned impact does not happen
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immediately after the minimum wage policy, but instead, it happens over time through changes in
growth.3
Motivated by this literature on labor-labor substitution, it is possible that employers facing the
minimum wage increase might become selective in whom they are hiring based on employees'
races and ethnicities. This effect should also be examined over a significant period rather than
immediately after the minimum wage binding. The results from our analysis, which uses a
synthetic control method, suggest that the demographic composition of workers in the
"Accommodation and Food Services" and "Manufacturing" industries significant change in San
Francisco County – relative to a pool of control counties both in and outside of California – during
the post-wage-increase period.

Background
The San Francisco County's minimum wage bill was passed in November 2003 and became
effective in February 2004. The 26% rise in the minimum wage, from $6.75 to $8.5, was the first
substantial county-level minimum wage increase relative to federal or state norms. As inserted in
the San Francisco County's report, the primary mindset behind this minimum wage increase was
to help low-income employees with San Francisco's high living costs. The San Francisco Board of
Supervisors commissioned a report to determine how a local minimum wage would affect workers,
businesses, and the local economy. According to this report, reinforcement of minorities as the

3

Meer & West (2015)

3

majority of low-wage workers was also the stated aim of this minimum wage policy. Policymakers
intended that this demography of people get paid more by increasing the minimum wage.
However, for the policy to remain successful in achieving its goal, a fixed or even higher
employment proportion among these demographic groups needs to be observed. Suppose by any
means like displacing these people from the area, this policy results in a significantly lower
proportion of minorities working in San Francisco. In that case, we can assert that the policy was
a failure.
As mentioned before, there are lots of publications around a local minimum wage increase. But
this question of the impacts of these increases on the demographic discrepancy of employment has
remained unanswered. Dube, Naidu & Reich (2007) studied San Francisco's 2003 minimum wage
with a difference-in-difference method using Almeida County as the control group. Their analysis
looked at employment change and wages in restaurants and found no statistical evidence of the
policy's effect on employment rates. However, they did not analyze the labor-labor substitution
and the employment rate changes among different races and ethnicities. This paper has tried to
motivate a framework to examine the minimum wage's demographic effect on employment by
looking at the relative change in workers' demography – see if the minimum wage floor has a longrun impact on employment composition.

Data
For the purpose of this paper, I used quarterly county-level panel data for the period 2001 to 2010
as the data for our control group states are just available for this period. The data obtained from
different sources have been merged and cleaned into one panel data. For the variable under study,
4

employment, data come from the United States Census Bureau intercensal population estimates,
using the quarterly workforce indicator (QWI). The employment data estimate the total number of
jobs on the first day of the reference quarter. Beginning-of-quarter employment counts are similar
to point-in-time employment measures. The data contains county-level demographic shares for
black, white, Asian, and Native American groups, each broken down by Hispanic and nonHispanic groups. I categorized the data into eight different groups for all combinations of race and
ethnicity. This paper targets the low-income workforce using the employment data for the
Accommodation and Food Services and the Manufacturing industries.
The data for the unemployment rate, one of our predictor variables, is gained from the US Bureau
of Labor Statistics database.4 I reorganized the monthly county-level data into a quarterly format
to match our predicted variable format. I made the same arrangement for the multi-unit residential
construction data, the other predictor variable of this study. The multi-unit residential construction
is chosen because additional residential construction is likely to affect the county's low-skill labor
supply. Below, the summary statistics of our working variables are reported in Table 1.

Table. 1: Summary Statistics of working Data
Variable
emp white
emp minorities
ue
Multi-unit rescons

Mean
16288
18518
7.79
166.48

Std. Dev.
26774
38419
3.60
515.7

Min
0
0
2.167
0

Max
196981
393571
31.233
5374

I merged all the eight race-ethnicity groups into two groups of white employment and minority
employment because this study focuses on finding the difference between these categories.
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Synthetic Control Method for Case Study
For conducting a comparative case study, we generally examine the effect of some intervention or
policy on the exposed unit and determine the difference caused by that event with the unexposed
units. With this in mind, what we need is some control units similar to our desirable unit. Finding
these unexposed units in some cases is almost impossible. However, in case studies on a city,
researchers tend to find one or more cities with the same characteristics as their area of study. In
this case, the intervention is one policy or treatment specifically imposed for the region of their
research while it does not impact the control group. For all the deficiencies of finding suited
regions for the control group, an approach to build a synthetic control group is introduced by
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmuller (2010). This method, which is used in this paper, enables us to
assemble a control group from a pool of counties. This synthetic group is constructed as a weighted
average of our pool of counties in such a way that the synthetic San Francisco best resembles the
values of the predictor variables of San Francisco. For the aim of this analysis, the packages synth
from Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010) and synth_runner from Galiani & Quistorff (2016)
were used in STATA 16 to produce the synthetic control estimates and to complete the
comparative analysis.

Methodology and Empirical Analysis
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In this paper, I followed Abadie, Diamond, and Hailmueller (2010), to build a synthetic San
Francisco from a pool of 76 counties. This pool of counties consists of all available California
State counties alongside 20 other counties from all over the United States which had not faced a
drastic minimum wage increase.
I used this synthetic San Francisco in our Difference-in-Difference (DiD) model to identify the
change in the demographic shares of San Francisco employees following the minimum wage
increase in 2003. The demography of employment is categorized into two groups of white people
and minorities (or non-white). The demographic share of white employees, for example, is
calculated as the number of white employees divided by the total employees - for each specific
county.
In our DiD estimate, I used the data from the first quarter of 2001 to the third quarter of 2003 as
the pre-intervention period. Since we use quarterly data, the pre-intervention period is where 1 ≤
𝑡 ≤ 11, and t = 12 is where the intervention happens. Also, the post-intervention period would be
13 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 40, ending in the last quarter of 2010.
Following Abadie et al.'s (2010) notation, let 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑁 be the demographic share of employees for county
𝑖 at time 𝑡, in the absence of treatment, namely the minimum wage increase.5 Let 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝐼 be the same
variable after the county is exposed. We assume in our model that the implantation of the minimum
wage did not influence the demographic shares in the previous periods. We further assume that the
treatment does not have cross-county effects on the dependent variable. Let 𝛼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝐼 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑁 be our
parameter of interest, which is the effect of an increase in the minimum wage on the demographic
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shares of employment for county 𝑖 at time 𝑡. Finally, let 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 be a dummy variable indicating
whether county 𝑖 is exposed to the treatment at time 𝑡. From the definition of 𝛼𝑖𝑡 we have:
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑁 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡

(1)

Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the actual demographic share of employment, which is observable in the data. Notice
that San Francisco is the only county that is exposed to the treatment. Therefore, we have:
1
𝑆𝐹𝑖𝑡 = {
0

𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 38 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 > 12
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(2)

Our goal is to estimate the vector of after-treatment parameters (𝛼38,13 , 𝛼38,14 , … , 𝛼38,40 ). In order
to do so, we can rearrange (1) to get:
𝐼
𝑁
𝑁
𝛼38,𝑡 = 𝑌38,𝑡
− 𝑌38,𝑡
= 𝑌38,𝑡 − 𝑌38,𝑡

(3)

𝑁
Notice that 𝑌38,𝑡 on the right-hand side of equation (3) is observable in the data, but 𝑌38,𝑡
, the

counterfactual demographic share of employment without treatment in San Francisco, is missing.
𝑁
Now suppose that 𝑌𝑖,𝑡
behaves, according to the following model:

𝑁
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 𝑍𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

(4)

Where 𝛿𝑡 is the time fixed effects, 𝜆𝑡 𝛾𝑖 is allowing for time-county fixed effects, and 𝑍𝑖 is a vector
of observable characteristics for county 𝑖, In our model, 𝑍𝑖 consists of the unemployment rate and
multi-unit residential reconstruction unit.
76
∗
∗
Abadie et al. (2010) show that 𝛼38,𝑡 can be estimated by 𝛼
̂
38,𝑡 = 𝑌38,𝑡 − ∑ 𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 where 𝑤𝑖 is
𝑖≠38

1

derived from minimizing [(𝑋38 − 𝑋0 𝑊)′ 𝑉(𝑋38 − 𝑋0 𝑊)]2 , where 𝑋38 itself is a vector consisting
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of the unemployment rate, multi-unit residential reconstruction, as a weighted average of
dependent variables before the treatment.
Intuitively, we can estimate the counterfactual demographic share of employment in San Francisco
at time 𝑡 by a weighted average of the same variable in other counties. These weights are calculated
by minimizing Euclidian (or some other) distance between the dependent variable and the predictor
variables in San Francisco and other counties before the treatment. Then, I use these weights for
the post-treatment period and calculate the differences for demographic shares.
The advantage of using synthetic control for the estimated differences of the employees' share is
that it enables us to vary over time and evaluate the minimum wage's dynamic long-run
demographic effect. A traditional differences-in-differences model, as used in Dube, Naidu &
Reich (2007), fails to capture these effects and may underestimate the minimum wage's long-run
dynamic effects. The same is true for the mean comparisons used to estimate labor-labor
substitution in Farrais & Bujanda (2008).
Table 2 shows the predictor means for San Francisco and synthetic San Francisco for the
Accommodation and Food Services industry. I also added Alameda county's values, the control
group for Dube, Naidu & Reich's (2007) paper. We can see that the synthetic control group
resembles San Francisco better than the Alameda county.
Table 2: White Employment's Percentage, Predictor means

Variables
Unemployment
multi-unit rescons
White emp percentage 2001 Q2
White emp percentage 2002 Q3
White emp percentage 2003 Q3

San Francisco
6.22
308.17
36.34%
36.30%
36.21%

Synthetic
6.22
308.34
36.29%
36.23%
36.13%

Alameda
6.57
451.72
39.65%
38.72%
38.72%
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After running the synthetic control algorithm, we develop each county's weights, as discussed
previously. Table 3 shows the first 16 counties with the most weight in our synthetic San Francisco.
These weights are for the Accommodation and Food Services industry. For the Manufacturing
sector, the weights would be different as we use different values in our analysis.
Table 3: County Weights in Synthetic San Francisco

Honolulu, HI

39.2%

Marin, CA

11.2%

Imperial, CA

8.0%

Los Angeles, CA

5.8%

Madera, CA

2.8%

Cook, IL

2.0%

Siskiyou, CA

1.5%

Calaveras, CA

1.4%

Fulton, GA

1.4%

San Diego, CA

1.3%

Alpine, CA

1.2%

Lake, CA

1.1%

Yuba, CA

0.9%

San Mateo, CA

0.8%

Orange, CA

0.7%

Tuolumne, CA

0.6%

Results
Using the synth_runner package in STATA, the observed results for San Francisco and synthetic
San Francisco are as follows. The results are for two different industries, and both employees'
share of minorities and whites. I placed the results for minorities here, and by definition, the results
for whites are precisely in the other way. I also extracted the corresponding p-values for the
difference-in-difference coefficients (𝛼̂
38𝑡 ).
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Figure 1: Synthetic control and p-value plots for Accommodation and Food Services

As shown in Figures 1 & 2, the employees' share for minorities dropped in the next years following
the minimum wage increase. The p-values support the significance of these results. In other word,
with a higher minimum wage, employers tend to hire more white people rather than minorities.
That can also be due to higher demand from white people but does not change the employers'
selection behavior.

Figure 2: Synthetic control and p-value plots for Manufacturing
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Same as the p-values, another way to find out about our results' significance is using the placebo
tests, following Abadie and Diamond (2003). These placebo tests are conducted to see if the
minimum wage's observed effect in San Francisco is relatively large compared to if we assigned a
random county of our donor pool as the treated unit. For that, I apply the synthetic control method
to every county in the donor pool, assuming that county is the treated unit, and then plot the
differences between predicted and observed values for all counties. By this, I can examine whether
the San Francisco minimum wage effect in 2003 is large compared to the distribution of estimated
effects for the counties not affected by the minimum wage. Figures 3 and 4, respectively, show the
placebo plots for "Accommodation & Food Service" and the "Manufacturing" industries.

Figure 3: Placebo plots for Accommodation and Food services
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Figure 3: Placebo plots for Manufacturing

Conclusion
Considering all of the results thus far, this study can assert that employees' composition has
changed in the following years of the minimum wage increase. Whites' demographic share
increased, and minorities have experienced a diminishing share in low-income jobs. Contrary to
the opinion that the rise in the minimum wage would improve the economic standard of living of
minorities living in San Francisco County, it appears that the opposite occurred as the composition
of minority employment within the county significantly decreased – relative to the synthetic
control group – after the minimum wage increase took effect.
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